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An Essex County Superior Court jury convicted a fifty six year old man of trafficking over fourteen grams of cocaine on Thursday.  He was sentenced to the minimum mandatory three year state prison sentence, two years probation from and after that sentence and a five year loss of license. 

The case arose from the following set of facts.  On August 10, 2007 police executed a search at the defendant’s home.  When they encountered the defendant they conducted a “pat frisk” and found ten small packages of cocaine.  As the search continued officers located over twenty grams of cocaine, thirteen bags of marijuana, some cash, a scale, a police scanner and other assorted drug paraphernalia.  The defense unsuccessfully attempted to convince the jury that the drugs were for personal use only. 

Massachusetts appellate courts have held time and time again that the presence of drug distribution paraphernalia permits juries to infer that a defendant intended to distribute the illegal substance.  See for example Commonwealth v. Lopes, 25 Mass.App.Ct. 988 (1998).  In cases such as this, where there are numerous separately packaged bags, scales, baggies and a police scanner the jury will be able to conclude that the defendant intended to traffic the substance.  In this case, the defendant did not take the stand.  That made rebutting the inference much more difficult for the defense attorney.

Haverhill police arrested two young adults yesterday and charged them with possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, conspiracy and a school zone violation.  The arrests came about as a result of a raid on the defendant’s apartment that was authorized by a search warrant.  It is alleged that the couple had been selling cocaine in their own neighborhood for several weeks and that complaints were made to police about the recent drug activity.  During the course of the search police seized two bags of marijuana, five bags of cocaine and assorted drug distribution paraphernalia. 

Possession with the intent to distribute controlled substances in Massachusetts is punishable by imprisonment.  The Massachusetts school zone statute requires that a person convicted of either distributing, possessing with the intent to distribute or trafficking controlled substances be imprisoned for at least two years in addition to the sentence they received for the underlying offense. 

The Law Offices of Stephen Neyman is committed to defending the rights of those accused of committing drug offenses in Massachusetts and throughout the country.  Whether you are charged with simple possession, possession with the intent to distribute, distribution or trafficking you should contact a Massachusetts Criminal Defense Lawyer.  Convictions for violations of Massachusetts drug laws can result in imprisonment and a loss of license.  If you are involved in a criminal drug matter you can help yourself by contacting our office now.

In September of 2004 at 9:45 p.m. a Mashpee police officer observed the defendant driving down Route 151.  The officer knew that the defendant’s license had been revoked and attempted to stop the vehicle he was driving.  In an attempt to avoid apprehension the defendant drove thirty to thirty five miles per hour over the speed limit.  The defendant continued his flight, driving his car over an embankment and two to three hundred yards into the woods.  The vehicle was located unoccupied and a K-9 officer and his dog tracked the defendant further into the woods.  The defendant was found lying on his back with his three year old child lying on his chest. 

Among other things, the defendant was charged with violating G.L. c. 265 sec. 13L.  The defendant proceeded with a jury waived trial and was convicted of reckless endangerment of a child.  This law became effective in 2002.  The defendant challenged its application to him under the circumstances of this case and its constitutionality on the grounds of vagueness. 

In the context of this case G.L. c. 265 sec. 13L required that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 1) wantonly or recklessly engages in conduct that 2) creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury.  The constitutional challenge required the Supreme Judicial Court to resolve whether the statute provides a person of ordinary intelligence the opportunity to know what type of conduct is prohibited and whether the statute provides comprehensible standards that limit prosecutorial and judicial discretion.  The Court held that this statute did in fact meet these requirements and the challenge was rejected.  Commonwealth v. Hendricks, slip opinion 7/31/2008.

By late 2002 police in various Norfolk County towns were investigating reports of a telephone scam that victimized older persons.   Elderly people reported receiving telephone calls from males purporting to represent family members in trouble and in need of money.  The callers would ask their targeted victims to send certain amounts of money to certain locations.  Some of the victims agreed to meet the caller at the specified location.  Upon arrival they were met by the caller and when they asked about the whereabouts of the relative in trouble they were assured that he or she would be along shortly.  The victims surrendered the money requested, the caller left the area and the family member never showed up.  When the victims returned home they contacted the relative who was supposedly in distress and quickly learned that they had been victims of a scam.  The perpetrator was ultimately apprehended by an undercover police officer who replaced a targeted victim during one of the theft attempts. 

The trial was conducted in Norfolk County.  The defendant made the calls from Suffolk County and appealed claiming that the venue was inappropriate.  The prosecution was brought in part pursuant to G.L. c. 277 sec. 59.  That law makes the crime of larceny by false pretenses eligible for prosecution in any county where the false pretense was made or where the property obtained was carried or received by the defendant.  Rejecting the challenge the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that since the Suffolk County acts were designed to produce detrimental effects in Norfolk County, that the elderly persons were victimized in Norfolk County and that the victims had withdrawn funds from within Norfolk County that venue in Norfolk County was proper.  See Commonwealth v. Price, slip opinion July 29, 2008.

Larceny by false pretenses in Massachusetts is one of the many theft crimes the Law Offices of Stephen Neyman defends on a regular basis. This crime requires the prosecution to prove that you obtained the object through a false statement or representation and that you did so with the intent the defraud an individual or entity and that the victim relies on that false representation in parting with the object. 

In Greenlaw v. United States ____ U.S. ____ (2008) decided on June 23, 2008, the United States Supreme Court overturned an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that increased a defendant’s sentence by fifteen years. 

The defendant was charged with various drug and firearm offenses.  The government alleged that he was a member of a gang that controlled crack sales using firearms as a means of deterring competition.  The defendant went to trial and was convicted on seven of the eight counts for which he was indicted.  He appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on grounds that his sentence was excessive.  The government did not appeal the sentence.  Nor for that matter did it file a cross-appeal.  Rather, it simply opposed the defendant’s appeal.  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided on its own volition that the sentence was too low and it increased the sentence by fifteen years.  Greenlaw petitioned for certiorari and the Supreme Court heard the case.

The United States Supreme Court held that absent a government appeal or a cross appeal a court cannot on its own initiative increase a sentence.  The Court further stated that for appellate purposes, the parties frame the issues.  The function of the courts is one of a neutral arbiter of the issues raised by the parties.  This is known as the party presentation principle.  Any departures from this procedure have been justified usually in situations where a pro se litigant is being protected.  The Supreme Court continued that the plain error rule does not apply as an override to the cross-appeal requirement.

G.L. c. 268 sec. 13D(d) was passed by the Massachusetts Legislature in March of 2006.  The law was passed in part as a response to claims that criminal defendants were disseminating grand jury testimony as a means of intimidating witnesses, particularly in murder cases.  The law permits prosecutors to request a hearing for a court ordered protective order prohibiting defense lawyers from distributing grand jury transcripts to their clients.  The law requires the prosecution to demonstrate that 1) the defendant is accused of a violent crime and 2) based on “specific and articulable facts” the defendant presents a threat to the witness.  In assessing the viability of these motions judges are to consider the defendant’s history of violence, the nature of the charges against him and the existence of the threat to the witness.  A prerequisite to the order is that the defendant be permitted to cross-examine the witness. 

Recently, lawyers in Massachusetts have been confronted with prosecutor’s motions for protective orders under this law as a matter of course, especially in murder cases.  Rather than order an evidentiary hearing that permits cross-examination of the concerned witness, judges are often times endorsing the motions. 

There are challenges that can be made in opposition to these motions that stem directly from basic constitutional guarantees in both the Massachusetts and United States Constitutions.  Our office has been engaged in a challenge to this law for several months now.  It stems from a prosecutor’s blanket request that our client not receive certain grand jury testimony transcripts except in redacted form.  The judge allowed the motion never requiring the prosecutor to demonstrate the “specific and articulable facts” required under the statute.  The order was also issued without regard to our client’s right to cross-examine the witnesses to ascertain whether or not the client did in fact pose a threat to these witnesses. 

A 42 year old Fall River woman was held without bail after being arraigned in the Dorchester District Court on charges of kidnapping, assault by means of a dangerous weapon, kidnapping and assorted motor vehicle charges. 

At arraignment the prosecution disclosed that on July 22, 2008 around 12:00 p.m. Boston Police received information that a woman was screaming for help out of a window of the car being driven by the defendant.  The responding officer attempted to pull the car over at which time the defendant proceeded to weave in and out of traffic in an attempt to avoid apprehension.  Another officer observed the passenger crying out for help.  During the chase the defendant was driving approximately 80-90 miles per hour.  Police vehicles ultimately surrounded the defendant’s vehicle and after a struggle effectuated an arrest. 

The woman was held without bail pending a dangerousness hearing.

Ariel Lara Aguasviva of Jamaica Plain and his cousin Jorge Luis Ortiz Lara were charged with distributing heroin.  The case is currently pending in the East Boston District Court.  The prosecution alleged that an informant made a controlled purchase of heroin from the defendants.  After doing so undercover officers descended on the defendants who in turn locked themselves in their car.  Officers saw Aguasviva swallow what appeared to be drugs.  An arrest ensued during which Aguasviva was shot.  He suffered non life threatening wounds. 

Distribution of heroin in Massachusetts is s criminal act.  The term distribution encompasses not only the sale of the illegal drug but giving or sharing the substance with anyone including friends.  Penalties for heroin distribution in Massachusetts are severe.  If convicted you can be sentenced to up to ten years in state prison.  Second and subsequent offense are punishable by a minimum mandatory five year state prison sentence and as much as fifteen years can be imposed. 

Hiring a good lawyer is your best option for defending a heroin distribution case.  Often times the arrest was unlawful.  Searches and seizures that reveal the presence of drugs if not done within constitutional guidelines are subject to suppression.  Testing the weight of the substance can result in a reduction of the charges.  All top Massachusetts Criminal Defense Lawyers defend people accused of committing drug offenses. 

A joint task force comprised of the local office of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Medford, Massachusetts Police and the Middlesex County PACT Unit executed a search warrant at a Medford man’s home this past Monday.  Officers found and seized a total of nine kilograms of cocaine.  Seven were located in the defendant’s home and the remaining two were found in a companion’s SUV parked in the driveway of the home.  Law enforcement officials estimated the street value of the drugs around $500,000.00. 

The Medford man was identified as Heriberto Cruz.  His companion is Patricia Taia.  Both were arrested after the search was conducted.  They were charged with trafficking 200 grams or more of cocaine as well as conspiracy to violate the drug laws.  If convicted both face a minimum mandatory sentence of fifteen years in state prison.

Trafficking is the most serious of all the drug crimes in Massachusetts.  Mandatory state prison sentences have been set by the legislature.  Cocaine trafficking is broken down into four separate crimes.  Trafficking cocaine of 14 grams or more requires a 3 year state prison sentence.  Trafficking cocaine of 28 grams or more mandates a 5 year state prison sentence.  Trafficking cocaine of 100 grams or more is punishable by a mandatory 10 year state prison sentence.  Trafficking cocaine of 200 grams or more mandates the greatest sentence, 15 years in state prison.

The defendant was convicted in the Superior Court for possession with the intent to distribute PCP and for violating the Massachusetts School Zone statute.  He appealed his conviction on the grounds that the prosecution’s late disclosure of exculpatory evidence deprived him of his right to a fair trial.

At the time of his arrest the defendant had in his possession a quantity of PCP that the testifying officer considered consistent with an intent to distribute rather than for personal use.  Supporting this opinion was the defendant’s possession of items consistent with an intent to distribute.  One of these items was neatly folded money that the officer believed the defendant used as his bank role.  One of the defendant’s friends testified that the money was hers.  She further testified that she called the police station to claim the money.  Two prosecution witnesses testified to having checked the police logs and seeing no evidence of the friend’s call. 

After the evidence in the trial had closed the prosecution located recordings of two telephone calls that indeed supported the friend’s testimony.  The trial judge refused defense counsel’s request for a mistrial and the case was appealed.  The Massachusetts Appeals Court ruled that the late disclosure warranted a reversal of the conviction.  See Commonwealth v. Green, slip opinion July 21, 2008.